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On 15th December 2017, scholars involved in the research project met at the premises of the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg to present research on a newly emerging empirical puzzle concerning the political development of South Eastern Europe. The participants were delighted to welcome new scholars to the project. These are Kurt Bassuener, PhD candidate at the University of St. Andrews, Zeynep Arkan, Associate Professor at Hacettepe University, and Margarita Assenova, Director of Programs for the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia at Jamestown Foundation in Washington D.C.

The other participants were Sören Keil, Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University, Bernhard Stahl, Professor for International Politics at Passau University, Ana Bojinović Fenko, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, Senada Selo Sabić, Senior Research Associate in the Department for International Economic and Political Relations at the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb, Adnan Huskić, PhD candidate at the University of Graz, Jelena Džankić, Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, Mladen Mladenov, former PhD student at the University of Passau and Gezim Krasniqi, Career Development Fellow in Sociology at the University of Edinburgh.

Puzzle

The consolidation crisis of the European Union became apparent with the refugee crisis – if not earlier. So-called enlargement fatigue of the member states, political blockades among Post-Yugoslav States, Brexit and the resurgence of regional powers like Russia and Turkey make the EU appear like a weak actor, whose will to enlargement is increasingly questioned by West Balkan States. Which regional consequences for the region and its societies result from these crises and events? Do they lead to a revival of great power politics among re-

gional powers such as Russia and Turkey? How does the solely remaining super power, the United States, react to these developments?

How the research project relates to the puzzle

The workshop can build on findings emanating from four earlier workshops conducted for the research project "From Yugoslavia to Europe". In the first workshop, the participants presented the foreign policies of Post-Yugoslav States in historical perspective, i.e., from their independence onwards. Looking on the foreign policies in a comparative manner enabled insights into commonalities and differences in policy implementation, decision-making procedures, their geographical foci and national concerns. The second workshop focused on the different trajectories of the Post-Yugoslav States' foreign policies *vis-à-vis* the European Union: the workshop was theoretically framed by the state-nation problem, i.e., the state-specific ways of dealing with the relationship of state and nation, drawing on Weaver's and Hansen's "European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States" (Routledge 2001). The third workshop concerned the overlap of intrastate and regional conflicts: minority conflicts are fueled among other things by nationalist interventions of neighboring states. Therefore, it was argued that domestic reconciliation can only succeed if accompanied by inter-state reconciliation. In addition, the workshop asked which role the EU plays in regional conflict regulation. For instance, the EU demands Serbia's and Croatia's cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the same time, the ICC's authority remains highly contested among Post-Yugoslav States. This tension between compliance with EU-criteria and incentives for accession to the EU poses a typical problem for the EU's contribution to domestic and interstate reconciliation in the Balkan. In this context, the question about potential lessons-learned was raised in regard of the solution to the German-French conflict by European integration.

The fourth workshop dealt with elite behavior and decision-making procedures in Post-Yugoslav States: On the one hand, the participants asked how contested statehood impacts negatively on foreign policy formulation and implementation, e.g. due to a lacking monopoly on violence. On the other hand, the scholars inquired into the ways foreign policies are used for state building. In conclusion, foreign policy has indeed been employed by all states to defend their sovereignty against international actors as well as to raise legitimacy for regimes *vis-à-vis* constituencies. The relationship varied in intensity from state to state however, with Kosovo representing the most obvious case of how foreign policy is geared by the state-building purpose.

The results of these workshops and related research were published in the edited volume *“From Yugoslavia to Europe – The Foreign Policy in the Post-Yugoslav States”* (Palgrave Macmillan 2014). This research was also theoretically reinterpreted utilizing the concept of “security community”. Keil and Stahl argue, that the gradual democratization of Post-Yugoslav States has triggered social learning processes, related also to their participation in the EU-association process. These learning processes point to the tentative development of a regional security community: accordingly, war as a means of conflict regulation becomes increasingly “unthinkable” among Post-Yugoslav States. This argument also provides a theoretically-informed puzzle for the upcoming workshop in Regensburg, from 15th to 17th December 2017.

If democratization of Post-Yugoslav States has influenced their security policies, how does the recent stagnation of EU-enlargement policy impact on their foreign policies? Different factors contributed to this stagnation such as raised hurdles for accession to the EU, the EU’s consolidation crisis triggered by the Euro crisis and Brexit, as well as some regional states’ lacking compliance with EU-criteria or flawed application of the conditionality principle by the EU. Therefore, the EU appears weak compared to states claiming great-power status such as Turkey and Russia. Their changing policies suggest the region’s (re)transformation into a geopolitical “playing field” for great powers. Relations between the EU, NATO and Russia have deteriorated markedly after the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, which affected and will affect their security policies *vis-à-vis* Post-Yugoslav States. Russia and western states quarrel over the recognition of Kosovo, while Serbia and Kosovo are entangled in a conflict over northern Kosovo. These conflicts also show how regional and supra-regional conflicts intersect. Thus, how do EU, NATO, Russia and Turkey reconfigure their regional security policy in regard of the others’ foreign policies? How exactly do Russia and Turkey conduct great-power policies in the region? In other words, is geopolitical security politics returning to the Balkans?

Presentations and discussions

Starting with a methodological remark, **Bernhard Stahl** proposed an inductive “bottom-up” approach to theory-development regarding the relations between great powers and Post-Yugoslav States (henceforth abbreviated: PYS): this means to generalize from empirical patterns found in the collage of presentations thereby enabling an open discussion on the theoretical framework for the envisioned edited volume.

In his presentation, Stahl offered three theoretical interpretations for the **EU's enlargement fatigue**:

- Firstly, following Europeanization Theory, the PYS experience “download failures” by not complying with the Copenhagen Criteria.
- Secondly, according to Schimmelfennig’s theory of rhetorical action, states can be rhetorically coerced into complying with community norms, since misbehavior undermines their identity as members of that community: today, the promise of “uniting Europe”, first made in the Treaty of Rome, is not effective anymore though. Hence, EU members cannot pressure each other into a coherent enlargement policy by reminding themselves of such a promise. Resistance against enlargement does not threaten the respective state’s identity anymore.
- Thirdly, according to Wendt’s systemic constructivism, varied cultures of international anarchy are constructed by interstate practice: thereby roles are projected onto each other in spirals of interaction. States remember such experiences and turn them into expectations for future interstate relations: when they are institutionalized in law, organizations, books, media coverage, education etc. such experiences turn into a culture. Following this theory, the EU did not manage to cast the role contained in the Copenhagen Criteria on some PYS by not consistently applying the “conditionality principle”. Conversely, some PYS do not take up the envisioned role identity by “pseudo compliance”. Thus, working towards the rule of law, democratic institutions and a market economy does not result in friendship in this case i.e. what Wendt calls a Kantian culture of anarchy among the EU and PYS.

In the following **discussion** participants pointed out that the EU’s actorness is a negotiated achievement and should not be taken for granted as in Wendt’s theory. However, the Commission could be regarded as a powerful and unitary actor during the enlargement process. Conversely, the theory does not capture the variety of policies by EU members vis-à-vis PYS, while PYS try to win over different members to strengthen their cause within the EU. Finally, the actorness of PYS should not be theoretically assumed either, since implementing rule of law and democratic decision-making oftentimes endangers the state élite’s position.

A different perspective on **EU enlargement fatigue** was offered by **Soeren Keil**. He argued that it should be regarded as state building trying to stabilize the region. The EU wields more bargaining power than candidates for accession by dint of its common market and financial resources. Its focus is on governmental elites though. However, the EU faces several hurdles to employ its greater bargaining power: it lacks credibility with the PYS populations, it faces

corruption in PYS bureaucracies, it entrenches elites by excluding other elites and, finally, the EU itself faces a consolidation crisis, especially regarding the direction of its fiscal and monetary policies after the financial crisis, the rule of law in Poland and Hungary and its refugee policy.

Subsequently, **Kurt Bassuener** presented the **United States' foreign policy towards PYS**. He proposed to interpret the U.S. as “reluctant intermittent interventionist”, which indeed views the “Balkans” within a geopolitical frame – implying competition with other great powers. Accordingly, the U.S. did not consistently pursue state-building and democratization in their relations with PYS. Rather its policy aimed at interstate stability by supporting those elites subscribing to any kind of interstate peace. This comes as a surprise in that the U.S. views nationalism in PYS as caused by poverty, corruption and the élites' more general legitimacy problem vis-à-vis populations.

However, also from a strategic-realist perspective the U.S. did not meet its internal standards: it repeatedly failed to deter aggression and ethnic violence by not communicating a clear payoff matrix for PYS' political elites. For instance, the “Christmas Warning” to the Serbian government was unclear and disagreement among US governmental officials undermined credibility of the threat. Bassuener hypothesizes this to result from lacking consensus on the West's long-term goal.

Contradictions between the EU's and the U.S. policies toward the PYS compound this lack of strategy. For instance, they do not agree on the meaning of “conditionality”: for the U.S. this means coercive diplomacy but for the EU it means democratization. Indeed, the U.S. is frustrated with EU policy, but still hopes that EU can “take over” at some point. This is evidenced by NATO, which has passed responsibility for the West's South Eastern European policy to the EU.

In her presentation on **Turkish foreign policy towards the PYS**, **Zeynep Arkan** proposed the following research question: How are the Balkans constructed in the Turkish “security imaginary”? To begin with, Arkan observed that Turkey views itself as part of the Balkans and that the term “South Eastern Europe” is not used to describe the region.

Following an analysis of influential positions and institutions shaping Turkish foreign policy, Arkan presented the Turkish construction of the “Balkans” within its security discourse: after the 2000s a new conception of the region emerged carried by new transnational actors such as exchange students, grassroots organizations and newly founded Turkish universities in the region. These reconfigure the Turkish discourse by propounding new religious and historical links between Turkey and the region.

Turkish elites do this by drawing on analogies to historical Turkish-Southeastern European relations: these are largely based on the period of the Ottoman Empire, including e.g. an argument about the origins of Turks and the importance of religious affiliation within the Millet system. In this vein, the region becomes part of a Turkish heart-and-soul geography, sharing a common culture and past.

From these discursive resources, Turkish elites draw up foreign-policy concepts for today's Turkish-Southeastern European relations. A historical review of the rise of Turkey's "Western" identity and its decline after the Cyprus conflict (1964) preceded remarks on Turkey's identity crisis after the end of the Cold War. The influential figures of Davutoglu and Erdogan provided the discursive bedrock for Turkey's foreign policy toward PYS during the 2000s. Pointing to its imperial legacy, Davutoglu called for more "historical depth" in Turkey's relations with PYS: He urged Turkey to take on its responsibility in the region – akin to an "older brother" "guiding" PYS. Today however Turkey defines itself as mere "regional power" not as great power.

Margarita Assenova presented **Russia's foreign policy toward PYS**. She claims that Russia pursues an imperial policy in the region, not allowing for independent foreign-policies by PYS while also trying to influence their domestic politics. She argued that this foreign-policy orientation is evidenced by Russia's 'management' of its "near abroad" including denial of Moldova's statehood as well as thwarting Ukraine's and Georgia's rapprochement with NATO or the EU. Secondly, the "multi-vectoral foreign policy" propounded in official security doctrines basically envisions great-power management of the region. Finally, within Russia's geopolitical perspective, a conflict arises between the EU, the US and Russia among others about "spheres of influence" in the region.

Russia's tactical means to raise its influence in PYS countries revolve around its abundant energy resources. These underpin Russia's bargaining power in bilateral relations with PYS, backing threats and offers. Assenova argued that Russia thereby tries to attain a monopoly on the PYS energy consumption which would cement its diplomatic clout. Furthermore, the Russian Orthodox church is an influential transnational actor but can be considered a part of Russia's diplomatic 'toolbox': according to Assenova, the Orthodox church pursues the official "ideological program" in most PYS, trying to reverse a societal process of Western alignment.

In the following **discussion**, participants first asked about the proper interpretation of the failed *coup d'état* in Montenegro in 2016. Assenova suggested this to be an instance of Russian imperial policy aiming to prevent Montenegro's alignment with NATO. Noteworthy, Serbian officers apparently rejected to cooperate with Russia for the first time. Keil argued that it

could also be an instance of the “Russian-threat”-card played by Montenegro’s government directed at NATO.

In the more general discussion, multiple participants explicitly or implicitly asked about the concept of “power” and hence how to measure and compare the great powers’ influence in the region. At first, this issue was discussed by a comparison of Russia and Turkey in relation to the region. Participants stressed the importance of historical legacies in interstate relations visible in these two cases: both countries rely on their imperial past to justify their current foreign policy toward PYS, which had not been the case during the Cold War. They thus seem to become imperial rivals in the region, while it was argued that Turkey is dependent on Russian energy resources, particularly natural gas.

Another aspect concerned the aforementioned “Russian-Threat card”: PYS elites tend to present their countries as victims of Russian geopolitical meddling in their internal affairs. This raises their bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the EU and NATO. One participant suggested this may also mean to talk up and consequently overestimate Russian influence in the region: Russia does not offer an attractive alternative political project to PYS comparable to the EU. However, one participant pointed out that power is context-dependent since some countries are more vulnerable to Russian threats to cut energy supplies than others. In response another discussant pointed out that Russia can still spoil the PYS’ relations with Western countries and that this is precisely the basis of its foreign policy rather than a positive incentive to join the Eurasian Union: here, Russia’s power is based on relative gain-seeking since it augments its power by reducing others’ influence. However, depending on the specific bilateral relations, Russia may indeed offer a positive incentive i.e. support for autocratic and entrenched elites in PYS threatened by democratic institutions and the rule of law. Putting the finger on democratization and a rising middle class in PYS again, another discussant argued that economic incentives vary for different societal strata.

Furthermore, the EU’s power was judged to be greater than previously assumed by a discussant: the application of its conditionality principle curbed Russian energy-resources-based influence in the region. Bassuener pointed out that the EU lacks a strategy while Russia has a clear strategy and long-term goal, but both actors seem to fail e.g. in Serbia and Ukraine. Harking back on Bassuener’s remark on conflicting conceptions of “conditionality”, Keil argued that NATO and the EU indeed synchronized their understanding: while compliance with NATO rules was always regarded as easier than complying with the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria, this changed when NATO took a backseat in the double-enlargement project.

After a lunch break, **Jelena Džankić** presented **Montenegro's relations with the great powers**, especially Russia. Her historical overview explicated how the emergence of Montenegro was significantly shaped by exchanges with Russia. Both countries share orthodox faith and until the 19th century, bureaucrats were educated in Russia. King Nikolas then pursued a modernization agenda along "Western" lines after having established diplomatic relations with European countries by marriages. In 1904, Montenegro supported Russia in the Japanese-Russian war. After the demise of Yugoslavia, Montenegro supported Serbia. By these two examples and others, Džankić pointed to an Eastern orientation of Montenegro's foreign policy. After the split of the ruling party in 1997 and with the rise of the SNP, a creeping independence from Serbia can be diagnosed and again a turn to the West: Western European and American aid covered pensions and social-security expenses. The slogan "Either you go West or you go down" captured this renewed alignment.

After 2004, Russia increasingly invested into Montenegro's economy by financing an aluminum plant, by tourism and by actively trying to raise Montenegro's historical awareness of cultural links with Russia, e.g. by building memorials. A blow to Russia's policy came in 2006, when Montenegro sided with the West by recognizing Kosovo. Since then the EU has shaped Montenegro's foreign policy orientation: Montenegro joined its sanctions against Russia during the Ukraine conflict and it blamed Russia for the coup attempt in 2016. In her final assessment, Džankić concluded that Montenegro itself has become an arena for the great powers, which support different parties and elites within the country.

Finally, Džankić suggested a historical book chapter on Yugoslavia and the great powers.

In the following, **Mladen Mladenov** presented **Serbia's relations with the great powers**. Having sketched Yugoslavia's "Third Way" and Tito's project of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), he pointed to Serbia's ambiguity toward the great powers: Serbia tries to pursue good relations with all great powers – which is a delicate balancing act. In the context of EU enlargement, Serbia's ambiguity is compounded by the EU's limited understanding of Serbia's foreign-policy identity.

Its self-conception as victim of great-power politics is informed by remembrance of relations to the "Habsburg Empire" as enemy, and Russia, the Slavic brother enabling to raise the Slavic heritage to a nationalist program. Self-victimization raises the normative status of Serbian arguments e.g. in its relations to Bosnia, Croatia, NATO, the EU and Kosovo. This element of its identity discourse underpins an unapologetic foreign policy aiming at justice. Noteworthy, Serbia also itself claims to be a great power. This makes for a dual conception of the world which "is ruled by power not by law" at the same time as the claim of historical justice figures prominently in Serbian foreign policy identity. Distinct tasks follow from this

identity: external interests need to be balanced at the same time as internal factions need to be balanced against each other.

Currently, relations with the EU become more difficult due to the latter's conflict with Russia over the Ukraine and the discursive sympathy for rebels in Eastern Ukraine. Serbia remains neutral however, albeit the EU expects compliance with its sanctions against Russia. On the other hand, Russia uses its soft power to influence Serbian foreign-policy orientation. After 2013, it also increased its investment in Serbian security by maintaining Serbian capabilities and by cooperating in military planning.

Gezim Krasniqi began his presentation of **Kosovo's foreign policy** by stating that "Kosovo is a product of great-power state building." Krasniqi outlined Kosovo's relations with five significant great powers:

- Firstly, Kosovo is very sympathetic toward the U.S. and the U.S. could be called Kosovo's "patron": the U.S. embassy wields great influence in the development of Kosovo's foreign policy. Hence, if a state recognizes Kosovo almost implies the state's good relations with the U.S. Kosovo-U.S. relations are also marked by the great influence of American companies in Kosovo.
- Secondly, relations with EU are complicated by the conflict over Kosovo's sovereignty, which is not recognized by multiple EU members, including Spain, Romania and Cyprus due to domestic separatist conflicts. Conversely, Germany attained a significant role in taking over the U.S.' former leadership in cultivating Western relations with Kosovo. The majority of Kosovars supports EU integration while support is lower among Serbians. There also exists a significant diaspora within EU member states. They hope that if PYS join the EU, national borders become insignificant for travelling and commuting across the region, thus alleviating ethnic conflicts.
- Thirdly, Turkey has increasingly invested in Kosovo's economy in recent years. In addition, Turkey is financing Islamic schools in Kosovo, thereby raising awareness about the latter's Islamic heritage. However, Krasniqi argued that religion does not influence Kosovo's official foreign or domestic policies, since it furthers secular policies.
- Fourthly, relations with Russia have been strained. Russia's (failed) military intervention in Pristina in 1999, aiming to prevent Kosovo's independence from Serbia is still remembered. Russian support for Serbia's cause has prevented good relations with Kosovo.

- Fifthly, China increasingly cultivates relations with Kosovo. It practices a neutral stance regarding Kosovo's independence, while Taiwan was one of the first countries to establish official relations with Kosovo. Noteworthy, Kosovo does not want to be mentioned by Taiwan in order to prevent tensions in China-Kosovo relations.

The general discussion of these presentations started from the problem of EU actorness which had been discussed on a theoretical level before: the EU as a whole has a hard time to develop a coherent enlargement policy toward the PYS also due to the issue of Kosovo's independence. It cannot recognize much less admit Kosovo as a member due to principled opposition of five of its member states. The EU lacks actorness here and thus should not be regarded as great power, as a discussant concluded. This results in an incoherent enlargement policy toward PYS and allows forum shopping by the latter. Summing up, one participant stated: "The EU is perceived as a good address but not as an actor." Conversely, the West allows the Serbian great-power claim to thrive and its perception of its geopolitical importance to grow. Another participant pointed out that Serbia views itself as a "regional power" rather than a great power. Here, the conceptual question arose what the discussants meant by a "great power" and also whether the different states, such as the U.S., Russia, EU members, Turkey, Serbia etc. share in a common understanding of "great power".

Another participant asked about Saudi Arabia's influence in Kosovo. South Arabian Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) build Mosques in rural areas to spread Wahabism. As Kransiqi argued though, radical Islamic doctrines "scare" Kosovars, while religious discourse to counter such radical doctrines might be still catered to in this way.

Hereafter, the discussion turned again on the issue of how to compare the influence and power of the great powers: This time Russia's and the EU's influence in Serbia was compared. One participant argued, that the EU can offer more economic gains to Serbia than Russia, while Russia wields greater "soft power" since a majority of Serbs regards themselves as "belonging" to Slavic and Orthodox culture. Due to NATO's interventions, NATO membership is not regarded as realistic security policy by Serbia, while the EU is regarded as ignorant of the Serbian people. A discussant pointed out that Serbs reject globalization and do not know about European integration and humanitarian law. Thus, Serbia's political discourse and foreign-policy identity neatly buys into Russia's projection of great-power politics on the region – as do the U.S., Turkey and Montenegro. This is evidenced by the PYS dealing with the EU: Ana Bojinović Fenko pointed out that they seek allies among EU members which amounts to a struggle about having one's interests at least be known in the EU or by its most powerful members. Such politics poses a problem for states like Slovenia.

After a short break, **Ana Bojinović Fenko** presented **Slovenia's relations with great powers**. Fenko argued that the EU became a "significant Other" for Slovenia, anchoring Slovenia's foreign policy identity: Slovenia defines itself as "belonging" to the EU based on its civilizational belonging to the West. Among the regular great powers, the U.S., Russia and China are the most important interlocutors, but not Turkey.

Slovenia's "europeanized" identity is evidenced by aligning with the EU in the Ukraine conflict: Slovenia implemented sanctions against Russia in the face of significant economic costs. This policy could hence not be explained by a neat economic cost-benefit calculation. Conversely, Slovenia is a "swing state" for the EU, it is sometimes instrumentally used to further EU interests in the region. Secondly, the U.S. functions as Slovenia's main security provider in the region. Thirdly, Slovenia has cultivated relations with China: the latter has invested economically in Slovenia and Slovenia wants China to take on greater responsibility in the region. However, Slovenia has not developed a clear foreign-policy strategy regarding China. Fourthly, Slovenia wants Russia to join the value-system of the EU.

Afterwards **Senada Selo Sabić** presented **Croatia's relations with the great powers**. Croatia conceives of itself as historically protecting the borderland between Europe and the Orthodox civilization. Thus, during accession negotiations with the EU, Former Croatian President Franjo Tuđman argued that the EU had a moral duty to accept Croatia. Sabić observed that Croatia is not yet a functional member of the EU, either diplomatically or bureaucratically but its aspiration and goal remains European integration. Membership in the EU was regarded as rectifying a historical accident showing that Croatia is "not part of the Balkans". By contrast, Sabić argued, EU membership is conceived of instrumentally as being part of a club and enjoying a privilege which outsiders do not. Specifically, it means access to the EU's funding. This rather instrumental stance did not prevent a bottom-up process of democratization within Croatia, guided by civil society: formerly excluded groups gained a voice. The bilateral conflicts with Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are still to be solved though.

As in the case of Slovenia, Croatia relies on the U.S. in terms of security politics: military capabilities are bought in the U.S. while Croatia cooperates with the U.S. in the latter's "War on Terror".

Turkey formerly attained its significance for Croatia as a counterpart for its foreign policy identity: historical relations with the Ottoman Empire provide material for identity-based foreign policy arguments today. Liberals are still very critical of Turkey, due to the latter's authoritarian turn under President Erdogan, while conservatives sympathize with the Turkish government. Before the failed coup in 2016, Erdogan was greeted with the highest honors in Croatia. Russia is conceived of as Croatia's traditional enemy, equally an important

counterpart to Croatia's identity construction: Russia, as main heir to the Orthodox-Slavic civilization is used to delineate Croatia's Western identity.

Finally, **Adnan Huskić** presented the relations of **Bosnia and Herzegovina with the great powers**. Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth abbreviated: BaH) cultivates good relations with Turkey: this is evidenced e.g. by the former's cooperation in cracking down on the Gülen movement, which is also officially called a "terrorist organization" in Croatia. On the other hand, former President Izetbegovic is very popular among the Turkish population.

Russia has been a party in the Bosnian War, as a supporter of the Slavic cause. After the war it participated in state building of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the latter's phase of weakness. Today Croatia and Russia cooperate economically, especially in the oil industry.

In 2017, the "circle of 99", a group of intellectuals raised the question of how to engage China in the region. They want to raise awareness about China's regional perspective partially covered in its bilateral development policy: China grants loans for infrastructure and energy projects, which are relatively high compared to BaH's GDP. The 99 wanted to alert the public to the alternative China provides to the U.S' liberal order.

In the **concluding discussion** EU-PYS relations were debated. First, participants observed some PYS elites' lack of credibility in their commitment to European integration. In this regard, they diagnosed an elite-mass split, since many civil society actors credibly push for European integration. In the case of Slovakia, the EU first denied Slovakia accession but after a democratically held election which brought a pro-EU party into power created additional pressure on the EU to further the accession process. In general, some participants observed, support for European integration is decreasing in PYS. For instance, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the populace supports European integration merely due to the lack of viable alternatives, as a discussant argued. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the visions by Milorad Dodik of a multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina inside the EU stands against Izetbegovic's authoritarian program emulating Turkish President Erdogan. The EU's economic incentive of participation common market is judged by Huskić as economically rational, but the debate is not only about such "hard facts". Russia is increasingly winning "hearts and minds" in some PYS. Now the debate turned to the question of democratization and how the latter enables civil society to make its voice heard. It was unclear among the participants whether PYS governments, such as in Slovakia which features a strong civil society, need to respond to this pressure or not.

The concluding discussion then turned towards the question of which theory should be employed to interpret and explain the interlocking pattern of foreign policies. A participant

observed that the chapters should somehow avoid likely overlaps, while teasing out similarities and differences with other chapters.

An open discussion on the theoretical framework and the meaning of “history” in PYS-great power relations concluded the discussion. Finally, Soeren Keil made some remarks on the envisioned publication: first, the contributions should not be driven by an overarching theory while the introductory chapter will provide a theoretical interpretation. The chapters should take a more historical approach, but not in the sense of a historical overview: the question should be rather how different states remember their past, their interaction with Great Powers differently and how those experiences inform their foreign policies. Another set of questions should combine this with past Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) by the participants as Keil proposed: Who does foreign policy in the states? (Cf. statehood workshop) How is foreign-policy framed, worked out bureaucratically, operationalized. Which relevant internal – and external audiences are addressed?